On the 28th, Chinese news site Guancha.cn published an article titled 'Over a decade of effort in vain? Why did Japan's rare earth alternative plan 'fall through'?'

The article mentioned that 8 months have already passed since China began restricting rare earth exports to Japan. It stated, 'In January-June 2026, Japan imported only 13 tons of dysprosium, an 82% drastic decrease from the same period in 2024 before the restrictions. Yttrium oxide also decreased by 74% to 204 tons.' It pointed out that 'the noose around the neck of Japanese manufacturing seems to be gradually tightening.'

Furthermore, it stated, 'Japan promoted 'de-Sinicization' following the rare earth supply crisis in 2010, and the government invested an additional budget of 100 billion yen. It launched five measures: investment in overseas mines, strategic stockpiling, recycling, reduction in usage, and development of alternative materials. It proceeded with massive investments in Lynas in Australia, cooperation with Vietnam and India, among others, reducing its dependence on China from 90% to around 60%.'

On the other hand, it stated that 'the reality was exposed by the current export restrictions imposed by China.' It claimed, 'Australia and Vietnam mainly supply light rare earths, while dependence on China remains high for heavy rare earths such as dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium. Even if China's share of overall imports has decreased, China holds overwhelming dominance in critical heavy rare earths. In other words, there was a trick to the statistical '60%.''

Furthermore, it argued that 'the problem is not just mining.' It concluded that 'China also holds an overwhelming position in the separation and refining capabilities of heavy rare earths. Rare earths are extremely difficult to separate and refine, and China has been advancing technological development since the 1970s, now reportedly holding 81% of related patents worldwide. Even if ore can be mined overseas, if it cannot be refined, it is merely 'unusable rock'.'

It also introduced that 'Japan has high hopes for rare earths on the seabed, believing that vast resources lie beneath the seabed around Minamitori Island, and has a plan to begin large-scale mining trials from February 2027.' However, it pointed out that 'there are no successful examples of large-scale commercial mining at depths of 6,000 meters in the deep sea, and the costs would be several times higher than land-based mining. Moreover, Japan lacks the refining capacity for heavy rare earths, and complete domestic production would require at least 10 years.'

The article stated, 'In the end, the most realistic of Japan's de-Sinicization measures was 'to stockpile, no matter what.' Japan has increased its strategic reserves from 60 days' worth to 180 days' worth, and these reserves have 'prolonged the life' of Japanese manufacturing until now. Nevertheless, over 90% of Japanese manufacturing companies have not secured a sufficient supply for at least one type of rare earth related material, and the average procurement fulfillment rate remains at 68%.'

Then, it pointed out that ''unfortunately,' time is not on Japan's side.' It noted that 'no matter how large the inventory, it cannot last until the seabed mud turns into rare earths.' It sarcastically wrote, 'China can wait patiently. If one year is not enough, then two years; if two years are not enough, then three years. Japan's strategic reserves will eventually run out. See you then.'