On August 9, 2026, Chinese media outlet Caixin reported that the fundamental cause of Japan's declining birthrate is not merely a lack of financial support, such as allowances, but rather the "uncertainty" that prevents young people from being able to foresee their future employment and income.

The article introduced that, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications' demographic survey based on the Basic Resident Register, Japan's population as of January 1 this year was approximately 119.73 million, marking a continuous decline for 17 years, and the proportion of those aged 14 and under also fell to 11.13%, a continuous decline for 32 years since the survey began.

It also cited that statistics from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare show that the number of births in 2025 is estimated to be approximately 671,000, setting a new record low for the 10th consecutive year, falling below 700,000 15 years earlier than the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research's projections, thus accelerating the pace of population decline. The article further stated that projections from the same institute estimate Japan's population to decrease to approximately 87 million by 2070 and less than 50 million by the 2120s, about 100 years from now, indicating that the situation is extremely serious.

Furthermore, it introduced that the Japanese government has positioned the declining birthrate as a national crisis since the 1990s, expanding economic and childcare support through measures such as the enactment of the "Basic Act on Measures for a Society with a Declining Birthrate" in 2003 and the establishment of the "Children and Families Agency" in 2023, and introducing the "Child and Child-Rearing Support Fund System" from 2026. On the other hand, it argued that despite over 20 years of policies, the downward trend has not been halted, citing the reality that structural problems like employment instability, low wages, education and housing costs, and long working hours have limits when dealt with by a single ministry alone.

The article mentioned that single researcher Kazuhisa Arakawa pointed out that "high costs are creating 'marriage and childcare deflation'," stating that since marriage and child-rearing are long-term investments spanning over 20 years, it is natural for young people to hesitate in making decisions in a situation where the future is unpredictable.

Moreover, it analyzed the reality that young people are unable to secure stable employment and are anxious. It highlighted that 21.26 million people, or 36.8% of the total workforce, are non-regular employees; that there is a gap of over 100 million yen in lifetime earnings for men between university-graduate regular employees (approx. 289 million yen) and postgraduate students (approx. 334 million yen) compared to non-regular employees (approx. 150 million yen); and that the actual success rate of changing jobs is only 4.8% (approx. 3% for regular employment) despite a desired job change rate of 15.3%.

And as evidence of the widespread "wait-and-see" attitude due to future anxiety, it cited the rise in the average age of first marriage (husband 31.0 years old, wife 29.7 years old).

The article pointed out that during Japan's period of rapid economic growth (1955-73), a life scenario with easily predictable future existed due to the "Three Sacred Treasures" of Japanese-style employment: "lifetime employment, seniority-based wages, and in-company unions," but adhering to this model is unrealistic in modern times. It concluded that for a fundamental solution to the declining birthrate, it is crucial for politics, economy, society, and businesses to cooperate and build a highly certain environment where young people can foresee their future and confidently draw up their life plans. (Edited and translated by Kawajiri)