Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (President), will visit North Korea from June 8 to 9. This is his first visit to North Korea in seven years. It is said that there are "unprecedented aspects" to this visit. Hong Kong media outlet Hong Kong01 reported this.

Since 2026, the Chinese central government has entered a 'busy period for receiving foreign dignitaries.' In the first half of the year alone, more than 10 foreign leaders and other high-ranking government officials visited China. One major reason why President Xi had not scheduled any foreign visits in the first half of '26 is thought to be the extremely busy schedule of receiving these visitors.

However, President Xi's visit to North Korea was recently officially announced. It is expected that China will continue to be busy receiving visiting diplomatic dignitaries, but amidst this, the supreme leader will visit North Korea.

Moreover, Chinese dignitaries often visit multiple countries during foreign trips. The aim is to achieve more diplomatic results more efficiently by visiting many countries on a single foreign tour. However, President Xi's current visit is only to North Korea. Furthermore, the visit to North Korea was made not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a government department, but by the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee, which handles diplomacy for the Communist Party of China.

In China, it is customary for the same person to hold both the position of President, who is the head of the state, and General Secretary, who is the head of the Communist Party. When acting on behalf of the state, the title 'President' is used, and when acting on behalf of the Party, the title 'Party General Secretary' is used. While the title 'President' is usually used for diplomatic activities, Chinese media such as Xinhua News Agency are currently using the title 'Party General Secretary'.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited North Korea in April this year, paving the way for President Xi's current foreign tour. At that time, Foreign Minister Wang stated that this year marks the 65th anniversary of the signing of the 'Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea' (Sino-North Korean Treaty), and that a series of celebratory activities would be held. President Xi's current visit to North Korea is part of these celebratory activities.

The problem is that five years ago, China and North Korea did not hold large-scale celebratory activities for the 60th anniversary of the treaty's signing. Furthermore, on July 11, 2016, for the 55th anniversary of the treaty's signing, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un merely exchanged congratulatory telegrams, and there were no large-scale celebratory activities. The emphasis by both sides on celebrating the 65th anniversary of the treaty this time indicates a recent shift in approach.

Behind this is China's initiation of the 'skillful utilization' of Kim Jong Un. The most important content of the 'Sino-North Korean Treaty' is the joint defense clause. The text clearly states: 'Should either of the Contracting Parties be subjected to armed attack by any country or alliance of states and thus be involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render all-out military and other assistance.'

Since its signing in 1961, the 'Sino-North Korean Treaty' has been continuously and automatically renewed, and has been regarded as a guarantee for China to continue providing military protection to North Korea. This has been done to maintain a balance with the US-South Korea military alliance.

North Korea has long needed China's aid. China has acted as a 'friend who reduces threats' to North Korea. However, no country remains a friend to another purely out of selfless service.

The Xi Jinping administration has put forward national unification and national rejuvenation as important slogans. More specifically, the unification of Taiwan. If China forcibly pushes for unification with Taiwan, there is even a possibility of a US-China conflict. In such a situation, North Korea's role as a military ally for China has increased more than ever before.

Once the US and China fall into conflict, North Korea's role will become particularly important. In wartime, it can prevent the Japan-US-South Korea military alliance from focusing its targets solely on China. Furthermore, North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile capabilities serve as an asymmetric deterrent against the US's 'First Island Chain' strategy. At a critical moment, North Korea could even directly threaten Japan and South Korea, and deter US forces stationed in Japan and South Korea.

North Korea, which is subjected to thorough sanctions from the US, has no choice but to comply with China's demands. When China most needs military assistance, that is, in the process of China realizing national unification and national rejuvenation, North Korea is the only country that can play the role of military support to China under the pretext of 'treaty obligations'.

China's increased emphasis on the 'Sino-North Korean Treaty' is based on the fact that China genuinely has something to gain from North Korea. The reason for highlighting the 65th anniversary of the treaty's signing is to remind North Korea that the international environment faced by China and North Korea determines that this treaty could be invoked at any time.

More importantly, North Korea passed a new version of its 'Constitution' at the Supreme People's Assembly in March, implementing Kim Jong Un's 'two-state hostile theory' at an institutional level. The new constitution deleted all 'expressions of the unification narrative' related to 'national unification' and 'northern part,' etc., and for the first time included a territorial clause explicitly stating that the southern part of North Korea borders the 'Republic of Korea'.

For the first time legally, North Korea positioned itself as a state independent from the southern part of the Korean Peninsula and used the official name of South Korea, 'Republic of Korea.' This is a clear signal of 'abandonment of unification.' Both North and South Korea have, until now, not hesitated to use force to absorb the other, but with North Korea explicitly abandoning unification and recognizing the other, the foundation of the North-South Korean conflict has already been shaken. Legally, the Korean War has not yet reached an 'end.' What has continued to this day is a 'cold armistice' based on an agreement. North Korea's constitutional amendment has laid the groundwork for the Korean War to move towards a 'true end.' It is bound to trigger a series of chain reactions in the future.

The two major US strongholds in the Asia-Pacific are South Korea and Japan. The 'rationale' for the US to firmly hold onto South Korea is that South Korea supports defense against a unification invasion by North Korea. The fact that North Korea no longer mentions unification will undoubtedly significantly weaken the raison d'être of the US-South Korea alliance.

From a broader perspective, North Korea's actions, which consequently weaken the US-led camp, are extremely advantageous for China. In other words, through the constitutional amendment initiated by Kim Jong Un himself, North Korea has become a country that is worth a leader's personal visit for various discussions from China's perspective. (Translation/Editing: Hayato Kisaragi)